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JURISDICTION & NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
The Court of Appeals has appellant jurisdiction in this
matter pursuant to Utah Code §78-28-3(2)(a) since the order
appealed from is a final order of the District Court.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review for the trial court's findings of
fact is the clearly erroneous standard, Walton v. Walton, 814
P.2d 619 (Utah App. 1991).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
a.

I

Did the District Court conclude that in order for

Defendant to obtain custody, he had to prove that the Plaintiff
(mother) was unfit and did the trial court presume that the
mother should have custody when all other factors were equal?
b.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in

disregarding the intent of the parents of Defendant when it
awarded one half (1/2) of a home to Plaintiff as marital rather
than separate property?
c.

Did the trial court commit error in determining the

amount of income for Defendant based on historical earnings when
he was under court order to continue to operate a business at an
income of $1,000 a month?
d.

Was there sufficient evidence to support a findings

that Defendant had removed money from the children's trusts
accounts to invest in a business?

I

e.

Did the trial court commit error in deciding the

distribution of a business without the joinder of all interested
parties?
f.

Did the trial court commit error in requiring Defendant

to pay part of the cost of Plaintiff's witnesses?
STATUTES INVOLVED
The statutes and rules involved in this appeal are
reproduced within the brief itself as permitted by Rule 24 (f) of
the Rules of Appeal to the Utah Court of Appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The parties were married September 26, 1980 and separated in
early 1993. (Record 316, Finding 26).

They have four (4) minor

children, ages 12, 10, 6 and 3. (Record 160 and 316) The Court
entered a bifurcated decree of divorce on September 14, 1993,
because Plaintiff claimed that she had to have a divorce in order
to obtain Pell Grants to attend college. (Record 142)
Plaintiff later admitted that she had falsely reported to
the college that she was divorced and that the Pell Grant was
already approved when she made her motion to bifurcate for a
decree of divorce before trial. (Transcript of 1/20/94, page 135)
The parties were married in California and lived there for
three (3) years before moving to Utah in 1984. (Record 316)

The

Defendant worked as a custodian for the L.D.S. Church and the
Plaintiff as a manager of a Subway Store and as a dispatcher for
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a small police department when they first arrived in Utah.
(Transcript of 3/1/94 at page 42)
Defendant's parents have been intricately involved in the
lives of the parties and their children.

Since the move to Utah,

the parties have lived in a home purchased by Defendant's
parents. The trial court found that without the aid of
Defendant's parents, the parties "...would have faced financial
ruin long ago.." (Finding 18 & 28, Record 316)
Defendant's parents advanced $66,333 to start and maintain a
feed business run by the parties since 1987. (Transcript of
3/1/94 at 162)

When it was opened, Defendant continued his

custodian employment at night and worked at the store during the
day.

Plaintiff quit her job to work at the store.

of 3/1/94 at page 65)

(Transcript

Defendant's parents also worked in the

business. (Transcript of 3/1/94, pages, 92, 159, and 166)

When

the divorce complaint was filed, Defendant took over the full
time management of the business by agreement and court order.
(Transcript of 3/1/94 at 159 and Record 92)
Defendant and his brother worked for their parents in the
family mortuary business for years prior to this marriage. When
the mortuary business was sold, the parents decided to give
Defendant his share of the sale proceeds based on the work he had
put into the mortuary business when he was younger. (Transcript
of 3/1/94 at page 157)
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Defendant's parents also purchased the home where the
parties resided since 1984. The purchase price was $45f000, but
Defendant's parents also spent $3,744 for repairs and in 1986,
approximately $79,500 to remodel and double the size of the home.
(Transcript of 3/1/94, at pages 10, 12, 155, Hecord 316, Findings
27, 28, 29, & 30 and Record 316, Exhibit #6)

The parties never

paid any rent for the home, but did pay some taxes. (Record 361,
Finding 29)
In 1989, Defendant's parents deeded one third (1/3) of the
property to the parties as joint tenant. According to undisputed
trial testimony, this was done to avoid marital difficulties
between the parties. (Record 361, Finding 39 and Transcript of
3/1/94 at page 178 and 158)
Again in 1990, Defendant's parents deeded another one-third
(1/3) of the property to the parties for the same reasons and
made a final deed in 1991.
purposes.

Three (3) deeds were used for tax

(Record 361, Finding 29)

The court found the value of

the home as $125,000, however, Defendant's parents had spent
$128,244 on the home. (Record 361, Finding 47 and Exhibit 6)
Elizabeth Stewart, Ph.D., performed a custody evaluation at
a cost of $3100.00; each party was ordered and did paid one-half
of this cost prior to trial. (Record 92)

Plaintiff called Doctor

Stewart to testify at trial. (Transcript of 1/20/94)

She was of

the opinion that Defendant must prove Plaintiff unfit in order to

v

obtain custody.

(Record 189)

The custody and visitation issues were heard January 20,
1994 and the rest of the issues on March 1, 1994.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant maintains that the trial court committed
prejudicial error when it treated the assets of the parties as
marital assets rather than separate assets and when it assumed
that the mother should have custody of the children absence a
finding of unfitness of the mother.
The trial court also committed prejudicial error when it
required Defendant to pay for the cost of having the court
appointed evaluator testify for Plaintiff, when the court imputed
income to Defendant for support purposes, and when it accepted
Plaintiff's word that $7,000 was owed to the children's trust
without requiring documentary evidence.
ARGUMENTS
CUSTODY & VISITATION
When the parties separate, the temporary order allowed
Plaintiff to remain in the home with the children and granted the
parties joint custody. (Record 92)
block with his parents.

Defendant moved only one (1)

(Record 361, Finding 4)

This order

appears to have given Plaintiff an advantage over Defendant in
the custody decision of the court.
The trial court found that joint custody was in the best

5

interest of the children, but awarded physical placement to the
mother because she was in the home. (Record 361 Findings 25 & 48)
The trial court found that both parents were good parents,
and left the children with Plaintiff because she was in the home
and had been since the separation.

(Record 361, Finding 48 & 49)

In fact, all of the testimony showed that Defendant was an
exceptional father and involved in the lives of his children more
than the "average" father. (Discussed hereafter.) Under the
decision of the trial court, it would appear impossible for a
father to ever obtain custody, absence a finding of unfitness of
the mother.
Utah Code §30-3.10 (1) & (2) reguires that the trial Court
consider certain factors in determining custody. It states in
pertinent part:
"... in determining custody, the court shall consider the
best interest of the child and the past conduct and
demonstrated moral standards of each of the parties. The
court may inguire of the child and take into consideration
the child's desires regarding the future custody, but
the express desires are not controlling and the court may
determine the child's custody otherwise.
"In awarding custody, the court shall consider, among other
factors the court finds relevant, which parents is most
likely to act in the best interest of the child, including
allowing the child freguent and continuing contact with the
non-custodial parent as the court finds appropriate."
The trial Court made findings regarding all of these
elements and on each found that both parties were egual or that
the weakness of one (1) was off set by other strengths. (Record

i,

361 Findings 6 through 25)

This leads to the conclusions that

the trial court must have applied an assumption that custody
should go to a mother over a father if all things are equal.
There is no statutory presumption in favor of a mother. Rice
v. Rice, 564 P.2d 305 (Utah 1977)

There was at one (1) time in

Utah law, but his is an old rule that is now subordinate to the
higher rule that custody should be based upon the best interest
of the child. Briqham v. Briqham, 575 P.2d 703 (Utah 1978)
Utah statutes do not contemplate any discrimination or
inequality based on sex. Martinett v. Martinett, 331 P.2d 779
(1961)

Since no presumption exist in deciding custody, the trial

court must make specific findings on the factors relied upon in
awarding custody of a child to one (1) parent over another.
Hutchinson v. Hutchinson, 649 P.2d 38 (Utah 1992)
One (1) important consideration ignored by the trial court
in this case was pointed out it Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d
1218 (Utah 1980) where the Utah Supreme Court held it is
important in deciding custody to determine if one (1) parents has
intentionally caused the children to be antagonistic toward the
other parent.
In Smith v. Smith, 793 P.2d 407 (Utah App. 1990) Justice
Greenwood pointed out the importance of considering such factors:
"The best interests of a minor child are promoted by having
the child respect and love both parents. 'Fostering a
child's relationship with the noncustodial parent has an
important bearing on the child's best interest

n

Visitation by the noncustodial parent helps to develop this
bonding of respect and love. Interference by the custodial
parent with a noncustodial parent's visitation rights as
ordered by the court may clearly be contrary to the child's
best interest.
"We are persuaded....that interference with visitation may
be a factor relevant to the issues of .... the child's best
interest."
Plaintiff admitted her negative actions toward Defendant in
front of the children. She admitted that she had removed
Defendant's photograph from family pictures, she admitted to
calling Defendant names to the children, she admitted that she
called Defendant a liar to the children, and she admitted that
she had been obstructive in allowing the children to see
Defendant. She also assaulted Defendant in front of the children.
(Transcript of 1/20/94 at pages 124, 125, 128, 139 and 157)
The trial court ignored the close involvement of the
Defendant's parents in the lives of the children.

The

grandfather testified that he spent about 10 hours a week with
the children while the grandmother testified to extensive time
and involvement with the children each day, including providing
day care. (Transcript of 1/20/94 at pages 171 and 174)
It appears that the trial court accepted Dr. Stewart's
conclusion that Plaintiff should have custody because Defendant
had not proven her unfit.

(Record 189)

This is not proper.

trial court must makes its own determination as to custody and
can not simply adopt the decision of a custody evaluator.

?

The

Robinson v. Myers, 599 P.2d 513 (Utah 1979)
Elizabeth Stewart's custody evaluation was not helpful to
the Court. She made a lot of mistakes. For example, she did no
psychological tests; her recommendations were based solely on
interviews with the parties and the children; she made little, if
any, collateral contacts, she did not visit the homes of the
parties, and she made no effort to confirm any of the information
given by the parties.

(Transcript of 1/20/94 at page 37)

Doctor Stewart admitted that Defendant is much more involved
in and concerned about his children than the "average" father.
Doctor Stewart testified:
"In the recent year, prior to that time, Mr. Schwartz was
certainly around, as I mentioned in the report, he did a
good deal of the domestic work and for that reason he was
around home much more than most fathers were. From the
point of the physical care and time in the home and ability
to maintain a domestic schedule, he can do that.
...certainly Mr. Schwartz had a lot of time in the home,
much more so than most fathers do and he had much more
actual what I call "domestic experience" taking care of both
the home and the children.
(Transcript of 1/20/84 at pages 53-54)
Defendant had Doctor Stewart's report reviewed by another
psychologist. Dr. Gale Stringham testified that Doctor Stewart's
recommendations were inconsistent with her own report;
(Transcript of 1/20/94 at page 90) Also that:
1.
She (Doctor Stringham) had worked in the mental health
field for the past 17 years and had performed more than 100
custody evaluation for the Third and Fourth District Courts.
2.

She had not met with Mrs. Schwartz nor the children,
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but that she had reviewed the report of Doctor Stewart and
meet with Mr, Schwartz for two (2) hours.
3.
The criteria used by psychologist to do custodial
evaluations included those in the Utah Code as well as
standard psychological testing, to include standardized test
in intelligence measure, standardized testing for
personality and pathology measures, clinical interviews, and
observation of each parent with the children to determine
how the children react and respond to the parent,
4.
Custody evaluations should also include collateral
sources contacts to add information to the clinical
impressions that are achieved through the testing and the
clinical interviews. (Transcript of 1/20/94 from 67 to 90)
Regarding Doctor Stewart's report, Doctor Stringham
testified that the Steward report did not meet the standards
expected in a custodial evaluation because Doctor Stewart had
done little or no psychological testing, she make little or no
collateral source contacts, and that Doctor Steward had not
followed the standard protocol for custody evaluations.
Doctor Stringham was also concerned about Plaintiff's
negative conduct about Defendant in front of the children.
MR. COLLINS: And if there was a situation where one of the
parents was providing negative information, in this case I
think you read the report where the mother admits saying
negative things about the father, what type of affect would
that have on the testing procedure? In other words, would
there be indicated additional follow up under those
circumstances?
DR. STRINGHAM: If I had an evaluation such as this where
the one party acknowledged that they had said negative
things regarding the other party around the children or
where the children could overhear, I would be particularly
concerned about how that was affecting the child.
(Transcript of 1/20/94 from 69 to 90)
When Doctor Stewart's lack of a proper protocol for a

\o

custody evaluations is considered, it is obvious that the trial
court must have accepted Doctor Stewart's premiss; i.e. that
since Defendant had not proven Plaintiff unfit, he was not
entitled to physical custody.
IMPUTED INCOME
Did the trial court improperly impute income to Defendant?
Defendant terminated his custodian job in November 1992 as a
joint decision of the parties and now manages the feed business
full time. (Finding 69, Record 361)

The parties agreed at the

original temporary hearing that the business could only support
paying Defendant $1,000 a month.

(Record 92)

The trial court disregarded this admission by Plaintiff and
found that Defendant had taken $9,000 from the business as
unexplained "draws". (Finding 70, Record 361) The trial court
also found that Defendant's parents had given an additional
$21,333,30 to Defendant for the business since separation of the
parties in February 1993.

(Finding 54. Record 361).

For some reason, the court then took the $9,000 which was
obviously from the $21,333.30 loan money and called that
Defendant's extra income and used it to calculate child support.
(Finding 76, Record 361)

Plaintiff's CPA testified that this

$9,000 was taken by Defendant against capital and was not income
and was explained by Defendant. (Transcript of 3/1/95 at page 30)
Since Plaintiff ran the business before the temporary order,

//

it must be presumed that she had knowledge what could be paid
from the business for management.

(Record 92)

The trial court imputed income to Defendant (Record 361,
Finding 76) at his pre-separation earnings rate. The trial court
did so by including the $9,000 loan money. (Record, Findings 69 &
76)

The reasoning of the trial court was that the children

deserved such a finding. (Record 361, Finding 76)
The trial court did not make the findings required by Utah
Code §78-45-7.5(7)(a). A trial court may impute income so long as
it follows the requirements of the code 7 which states:
"Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the parent
stipulates to the amount imputed or a hearing is held and a
finding made that the parent is voluntarily unemployed or
underemployed."
In order for a court to impute income for the purpose of
increasing child support, the trial court must first find that at
the time of trial the spouse is intentionally unemployed or
underemployed.

Hill v. Hill, 841 P.2d 722 (Utah App. 1992).

Failure make such a finding is an abuse of discretion.

There was

not such finding in this case. The trial court simply found that
Defendant voluntarily terminated his employment prior to
separation. (Record 361, Finding 71)
The evidence supports the fact that Defendant was not
unemployed nor voluntarily underemployed.

The parties and

Defendant's parents had a substantial investment in the feed
business and the court found that Defendant was protecting this
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The trial court ignored the fact that all checks for the
home were written either to the Defendant or to the construction
workers and none of the checks were ever written to Plaintiff.
(Record 351, Exhibit 6)
The way checks are written is important in deciding the
intent of a gift in such situations.

See Osquthorpe v.

Osquthorpe, 804 P.2d 530 (Utah App. 1990) where the husband's
parents gave both parties substantial cash payments during the
marriage, but the checks were payable to both parties.
Defendant's parents were very careful to insure that each
check was made out to Defendant and not to both of the parties.
(Record 361, Exhibit 6)

This is clear evidence of their intend

was to give these funds to Defendant and not as a joint gift.
Defendant's parents never requested a return of the funds
for the home as they did the funds use to start the feed
business. (Record 361, Finding 67)
A trial court can distribute separate property to the other
spouse regardless of how title is held, but must set forth its
reasons clearly in its findings. Huck v. Huck/ 734 P.2d 417 (Utah
1986 and Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133 (Utah 1987).
The thrust of the trial court's decision is based on the
status of the title to the home and the method of deeding the
property for tax benefits. (Record 361, Finding 39 & 40)
Defendant's parents did not understand the methods used to
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testified to the contrary:
MR. COLLINS: How about your ex-husband. For example, did
you and he ever talk about it being his inheritance?
MRS. J. SCHWARTZ: He talked about it was a gift from his
parents and they wanted him to have it now.
MR. COLLINS:

Did he talk about it being his inheritance?

MRS. J. SCHWARTZ:
such.
MR. COLLINS:

I believe at one time he stated it as

And this was prior to your filing for divorce?

MRS. J. SCHWARTZ:

Oh, yes.

A couple of years.

(Transcript of 3/1/94 at page 103)
The Defendant had discussions with the Plaintiff about the
inheritance and the property on many occasions.

She was slow to

admit it at trial, but it is clear from her testimony that she
knew the home was intended as Defendant's inheritance and that
she knew that the intent of Defendant's parents was that he
receive the home as his inheritance. Defendant's testimony was
also contrary to the finding of the trial court. He testified:
MR. R. SCHWARTZ: We, no, because we knew it was my
inheritance. I mean, that is why they purchased it for us.
MR. COLLINS:

How did you both know, that is my question.

MR. R. SCHWARTZ: Well, because she knew that I grew up in
the family business and when they sold the mortuary I had my
inheritance, I decided to take it then to purchase the home.
It was a home that we both decided we wanted to live in.
MR. COLLINS:

Did you discuss this information?

MR. R. SCHWARTZ: We had discussed. She knew I had an
inheritance coming from the mortuary, working there when I
was growing up and so, I mean, she always knew that it was

IL

my ..inheritance,
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TRUST ACCOUNT REPAYMENT
Plaintiff testified that the parties had borrowed some money
from the trusts accounts of the children in October or November
1989. These accounts which were solely under Plaintiff's control
and Defendant had not control over them. (Transcript of 3/1/94 at
page 152)

Defendant had no knowledge of this. (Record 361,

Findings 63)
There was no further evidence tendered by Plaintiff; no bank
records even though they existed, no canceled checks and no
records in the business. (Transcript of 3/1/94 at 148 to 152 and
Record 361, Exhibit 16)
All of the trust accounts and records were kept by Plaintiff
at the time of the alleged loan.

There was not sufficient

evidence to support a findings that Defendant had removed $7,000
from these trusts accounts to place in the business.
Notwithstanding this lack of evidence, the trial court used
this claim in off setting Defendant's interest in the property
distribution.

There was no further proof on this issue. These

claims were not even alleged until trial. (Transcript of 3/1/94
at page 152)
PAYMENT OF WITNESS FEES
The trial court found that neither party could afford to
contribute to the fees of the other party and that Defendant did
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court to reconsider distribution without consideration of the
alleged loan.
This court should remand the issue of custody for more
specific findings as to the court's reasons for awarding custody
to the mother and should direct the trial court to give the
Defendant an equal opportunity at custody without consideration
of sex.
Finally, the Court should award an off set in the property
division once properly decided by the trial court for Defendant's
cost and attorney's fees on appeal.
Respectfully Submitted

C. ROBERT COLLINS
Attorney for Defendant
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
This is to certify that on the 3rd day of January, 1995,
four true and correct copies of the foregoing were delivered to
counsel for Plaintiff at his offices at:
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Attorney at Law
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Provo, UT 84603
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DI
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JERRI K. SCHWARTZ,

)

Plaintiff & Appellee,

)

Case No. 934400154

vs.

)

NOTICE OF APPEAL

RANDALL I. SCHWARTZ,

)
)
)

Judge Anthony W. Schofield

Defendant & Appellant.

NOTICE is hereby given that Defendant and Appellant, RANDALL
I. SCHWARTZ, appeals to the Utah Court of Appeals the final
judgment of the Honorable Judge Anthony W. Schofield, entered in
this matter on June 1, 1994. The appeal is taken from those parts
of the decision that deal with child custody, income, business
property, the home and other financial matters to be hereafter set
forth in the brief.
Dated this 22nd day of June, 1994.

fO>

listened to arguments of counsel, and having heretofore entered its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, the Court now makes and enters the following:
AMENDED DECREE OF DIVORCE
1.

Mother and Father are awarded joint legal custody of the four minor children,

to-wit: Cari Jo Schwartz, age 12; Kelli Schwartz, age 10; Derek Schwartz, age 6; and Tyler
Schwartz, age 3.
2.

Mother is awarded primary physical custody of the minor children.

3.

Father is awarded liberal visitation with the minor children, to include statutory

visitation.
4.

Father is awarded five weeks of summertime visitation with the minor children,

which visitation shall be divided into a two-week period and a three-week period. Plaintiff shall
have a two-week period between the two visitation periods with Father. Mid-week visitation will
end at 8:00 p.m. on school nights and 9:00 p.m. on non-school nights. Christmas holiday will
alternate every year with one party having the children from the beginning of the school
Christmas recess until December 26, and the other party having the children from December 26
until the end of the school recess. The party having visitation starting after Christmas Day will
get Thanksgiving visitation during that year. Father will pick up the children for visitation and
Mother will pick up the children at the conclusion of visitation. Given the extent of mid-week
visitation, no special visitation for children's birthdays will be provided.

DON R. PETERSEN (2576), for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
120 East 300 North Street
P.O. Box 778
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (801) 373-6345
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991

Our File No. 22,056

Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JERRI K. SCHWARTZ,
AMENDED DECREE OF DIVORCE
Plaintiff,
Case No. 934400154
Hon. Anthony W. Schofield

vs.
RANDALL I. SCHWARTZ,
Defendant.

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial on December 20, 1993, with
respect to the issues of custody and visitation. The Court took the matter under advisement and
entered its Memorandum Decision on January 19, 1994. Disposition of the home, business and
personal property and issues of support were reserved for subsequent trial, held March 1, 1994.
The Court issued its Ruling dated March 30, 1994.
Don R. Petersen represented plaintiff ("Mother"), and C. Robert Collins represented
defendant ("Father"). Having heard the testimony of witnesses, received documentary evidence

A/T)

9.

It is hereby ordered that the evening-out of the various liabilities of the parties

will occur by adjustment to the home equity owed by Mother to Father.
Mother owes Father:

less
less

$62,500
14,174
7,000

plus

1,500

Total:

Home equity
Business equity he owes her
Mortgage debt she will pay
Excess of value of personal property

$42,826

This amount is due from Mother to Father at the appointed time. This is equitable, as
Mother has a home to live in but he does not. It is appropriate he not pay her the equity from
the business until she pays him the equity from the home. This allows him maximum funds for
the present time from which he can finance his own housing and living expenses.
10.

It is hereby ordered that Father is to replace into the children's trust accounts

the sum of $7,000.00. To ensure the funds are available for the children, both parties are to be
signatories on the children's trust accounts; withdrawals only can occur upon the child reaching
18 or upon further order of the Court. These funds are to be replaced within one year of entry
of the decree.
11.

It is hereby ordered that both parties are to share equally in the cost of the

custodial evaluation. To the extent one party has borne a greater share of the cost than the
other, that party is entitled to reimbursement from the other so that each pays an equal amount.

5.

The Court hereby adopts the parenting plan, Exhibit 17 and as amended by

Exhibit 19. The parties may agree upon such additions or changes to the plan as they think
appropriate, but are directed to execute the plan as amended hereby, unless they otherwise agree
in writing on a different plan.
6.

The plaintiff mother, Jerri K. Schwartz, is awarded all right, title and interest

in and to the home, which property is more specifically described as follows:
Beginning at a point 1211.32 feet North and 230 feet West of
the Southeast corner of the Southeast one-quarter of Section
34, Township 5 South, Range 2 East, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian; thence West 100 feet; thence North 209.17 feet;
thence South 88° 15' East 100.05 feet; thence South 206.11
feet to beginning.
7.

The plaintiff mother is hereby awarded the horses, saddles and personal

property as described in the Findings of Fact herein, but is liable for the mortgage, the
difference in value of the personal property, and is hereby ordered to pay to Father his one-half
equity in the home upon her remarriage, death, refinancing the home, or further encumbering
it, cohabiting with another male, or the youngest child reaching age 18.
8.

The defendant father, Randall I. Schwartz, is awarded the business, the camper

and personal property as described in the Findings of Fact, but is liable for repaying the
children's trust accounts the amount which the business borrowed, and to pay Mother one-half
of the value of the business.

16.

The Court finds that neither party has the ability to pay the other's attorney

fees. Therefore, no attorney fees are awarded.
17.

In the custody decision, the Court directed the parties to agree on a parenting

plan. They came close but did not complete the negotiation process. The Court therefore will
direct appropriate adjustments to the draft parenting plan received as Exhibit 17 and the
offsetting comments received as Exhibit 19 be made.
18.

Visitation, though liberal, only includes five weeks of summertime visitation

with Father, whose visitation will be divided into a two-week period and a three-week period.
Mother shall have a two-week period between the two visitation periods with Father. Mid-week
visitation will end at 8:00 p.m. on school nights and 9:00 p.m. on non-school nights. The
Christmas holiday will alternate every year, with one party having the children from the
beginning of the school Christmas recess until December 26, and the other party having the
children from December 26 until the end of the school recess. The party having visitation
starting after Christmas Day will get Thanksgiving visitation during that year. Father will pick
up the children for visitation, and Mother will pick up the children at the conclusion of
visitation. Given the extent of mid-week visitation, no special visitation for the children's
birthdays will be provided. Other than these modifications, the parenting plan, Exhibit 17, is
adopted. The parties may agree upon such additions or changes to the plan as they think

A-i

12.

The Court orders that there is an additional sum of $731.98 due and owing to

Elizabeth B. Stewart, who performed the custodial evaluation.
13.

Pursuant to the guidelines, Father is ordered to pay to Mother child support in

the sum of $495.00 per month. As Father has always paid child support and as he is an owner
of the business rather than an employee, a withhold and deliver is not required unless subsequent
evidence is provided which demonstrates a failure to pay on a timely basis.
14.

Mother is not awarded alimony. She is quite able to provide for her own care,

particularly when the amount of child support is added in, as well as she has use of a home
without rent or significant mortgage debt. While she claims need, it is not really demonstrated.
She has income and support of around $1,500.00 per month. Her expenses are listed as
$1,737.00 per month. Mother has control over the amount of riding lessons she teaches. As
such, it appears she has capacity to earn the shortfall which exists between her income and her
listed expenses. Mother anticipates completing schooling in amount 5 to 6 years; then, she
anticipates sufficient income to meet her needs.
15.

The Court finds that Father does not have the ability to pay alimony. To a

great extent, this family has lived on the generosity of Father's parents. While he has a legal
obligation to his divorcing wife, his parents do not. The Court imputes income to him for
purposes of protecting the children but will not do so where, with a modest stretch, Mother can
provide for her own needs without receipt of alimony.

DON R. PETERSEN (2576), for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
120 East 300 North Street
P.O. Box 778
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (801) 373-6345
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991

Our File No. 22,056

Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JERRI K. SCHWARTZ,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Case No. 934400154
Hon. Anthony W. Schofield

vs.
RANDALL I. SCHWARTZ,
Defendant.

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial on December 20, 1993, with
respect to the issues of custody and visitation. The Court took the matter under advisement and
entered its Memorandum Decision on January 19, 994. Disposition of the home, business and
personal property and issues of support were reserved for subsequent trial, held March 1, 1994.
The Court issued its Ruling dated March 30, 1994.
Don R. Petersen represented plaintiff ("Mother"), and C. Robert Collins represented
defendant ("Father"). Having heard the testimony of witnesses, received documentary evidence
and listened to arguments of counsel, the Court now makes and enters the following:

appropriate, but are directed to execute the plan, as amended hereby, unless they otherwise agree
in writing on a different plan.
DATED this /

day of #ayfl994.
BY THE COURT

& -

ANTHONY W. SCHOFIELD
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the
following, postage prepaid, this

day of May, 1994.

C. Robert Collins, Esq.
P. O. Box 243
405 East State Road
American Fork, UT 84003
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10.

Each of the parents desires custody of the children.

11.

Each of the parents desires that the children be kept together.

12.

Cari Jo, the oldest child, is a very sensitive young woman, demonstrably

affected by the divorce proceedings. She has responded by becoming protective and caring for
the younger children.

She has been a source of genuine stability for the other children,

shouldering a burden that a 12-year-old should not have to bear. In a sense, she is a surrogate
parent for the younger children.
13.

Kelli is ten and is bright and able. She is a happy child that is resilient and less

.troubled by circumstances than Cari Jo. She has a warm, loving relationship with both parents.
14.

Each of the two boys is active, inquisitive and warmhearted. Each is relatively

unaware of all that the divorce implies, and each has a strong bond with both parents.
15.

Given the observed interaction of the children, they each would be best served

by being kept together. It would be destructive to Cari Jo, who has a strong, protective nature
for her siblings, to be separated from them. Equally, it would be damaging to Derek and Tyler,
who rely to a large extent on their older sisters, to be separated from them. For the present,
the children must be kept together.
16.

Cari Jo has a more strained relationship with Father than with Mother. He has

not understood her as well and does not relate as well with her as does Mother.

FINDINGS OF FACT
The Court finds the following facts have been proven by a preponderance of the
evidence:
1.

The parties were married in 1980 and are the parents of four children, to-wit:

Cari Jo Schwartz, age 12; Kelli Schwartz, age 10; Derek Schwartz, age 6; and Tyler Schwartz,
age 3.
2.

Each of the children is well-adjusted and each has significant interaction with

both Father and Mother.
3.

Father's parents live near the marital home and have provided extensive child

care over the years for each of the children.
4.

Under a temporary order, Mother has lived in the marital home.

5.

Under the temporary order, Mother has temporary custody of the children.

6.

By agreement between the parties, the children have visited with Father every

other weekend and have had two mid-week visits with Father each week.
7.

The effect of the visitation schedule is that the children have retained a strong

bond with both parents. Each has been able to spend considerable time with the children.
8.

The parties have been reasonably cooperative with each other to ensure the

children have ready access to both parents.
9.

Mother has been particularly sensitive to have the children spend time with

Father.

(/ffy

Father has been able to provide meaningful care to the children while they have been in his care
for visitation.
23.

Tyler goes to Kinder Care day care. He also receives day care from his

grandparents. This should be allowed to continue as he has a bond with his grandparents.
24.

Joint legal custody as defined in Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.1 would be in the

best interests of the children.
a.

Both parents appear capable of implementing joint legal custody as each

has cooperated to a large extent in ensuring that the children have access to both parents.
b.

As the four children each have a significant bond with each parent, that

bond would be fostered by a determination of joint legal custody.
c.

Each of the children has been well cared for physically, psychologically

and emotionally. During the temporary period, the parents have been able to meet the needs
of the children without undue difficulty. The children would continue to be cared for physically,
psychologically and emotionally if an award of joint legal custody is entered.
d.

The parents have demonstrated an ability to give first priority to the

welfare of their children and have been able so far to reach shared decisions in the best interests
of the children.
e.

Each parent so far has been and is capable of encouraging positive

relationships between the children and the other parent. The Court is impressed with the

17.

Each of the parents is morally responsible. Each has a commitment to teach

values appropriate for our society and community. Each has similar religious values. Either
would do well in exemplifying values for the children.
18.

Each of the parents is similarly situated with respect to financial understanding

and money management.

The family has received considerable financial support from

grandparents of the children and neither parent has demonstrated a better ability to manage the
family'sfinancialresources than the other. Without the consistent support of grandparents, the
family would have faced financial ruin long ago.
19.

Neither parent has personality quirks or particularly unrealistic expectations that

would render that parent less fit to serve as custodial parent.
20.

Father is more rigid and somewhat less flexible than Mother.

21.

Mother is significantly involved in improving her lot through additional

education. She tends to over-extend herself some as she works, goes to school, and has a major
commitment to horse care and riding, which is both a hobby and an outlet for stress and
frustration.
22.

While each parent has been a significant caregiver for the children, Mother has

provided a greater portion of the parental care as between the parents, although Father's parents
(the children's paternal grandparents) have provided considerable care for the children both in
the form of day care as well as care in the marital home. Directly and through his parents,

system. During that same time, the parties performed general maintenance and upkeep, and they
paid for these smaller improvements.
31.

In 1991, Father's parents deeded the home to the parties as tenants in common.

32.

After 1991, there were minor improvements to the property, including

construction of a hay barn and installation of a secondary irrigation water line. Monies for the
hay barn came from the family budget.
33.

In August, 1992, the home was used as collateral to borrow $15,000.00, which

was used to buy a 1986 Suburban and also horse trailers for business inventory. Mother has
been paying interest only on that loan in the amount of $50.00 per month.
34.

Father asserts his parents told him the home was to be a gift to him, a part of

his inheritance, and they wanted him to have it now so it could mutually benefit everybody,
including the children. There was no similar discussion between the parents and Mother
regarding it being Father's inheritance.
35.

As part of parents' estate planning, an attorney assisted parents with conveying

the property. For tax purposes, the property was gifted to the parties over a period of three
years.
36.

Parents executed the deed to the home at their attorney's office; neither of the

parties were present nor had input into the form of the deed.
37.

Father never told Mother that the home was his property or that she did not

have an ownership interest until after she filed for this divorce.

maturity of the parents and the willingness they demonstrated to work cooperatively together in
the best interests of the children.
f.

At present, the parents live just a few blocks apart. The children are

able to walk between residences and to receive support from each parent.
25.

Based upon these findings, joint legal custody has a significant likelihood of

working in this case, and each of the parents has demonstrated the ability to work cooperatively
for the benefit of the children.
26.

The parties were married in 1980 and separated in early 1993. For more than

three months preceding this action, the parties resided in Utah County. During the course of
the marriage, irreconcilable differences arose between the parties making the continuation of the
marriage impossible. Grounds and jurisdiction exist.
27.

Since 1984, the parties have lived in a home in Lindon, Utah, which was

purchased by Father's parents.
28.

In 1986, a major addition of about 1000 square feet was added to the home.

The addition was paid for by Father's parents.
29.

The parties never paid any rent for their occupancy of the house. For the years

1987-1991, they did pay the property taxes on the house.
30.

Prior to 1991, the parties participated with Father's parents in improving the

home by building a barn and installing a sprinkling system. The parents paid for the sprinkling

46.

The video tapes received in evidence depict the condition of the home shortly

after the separation as well as its current condition. While very cluttered during the recent
inspection and video (Exhibit 21), there has been some damage, not extensive damage. There
were, for example, some new holes in the sheet rock walls and pencil and crayon scribbles on
the walls. As the damage was not extensive, it does not appear significantly to decrease the
value of the home.
47.

In other contexts, this Court has received evidence of a ten percent increase

over that time period. While it cannot rely on that extrinsic evidence, the home does have a
value greater than the 1992 appraisal. Given the appraiser's report and Mother's testimony that
it could be sold for more than the 1992 appraisal, the home is valued at $125,000.00.
48.

Mother desires to live in the home. She has custody of the children and they

have lived in the home since 1984. It is in the best interest of the children and Mother that they
be permitted to reside in the home during the children's growing years.
49.

Mother is awarded the home.

50.

Father has an equity in the home of one-half of its value, or $62,500.00.

51.

In 1987, the parties started a business, a feed store in Lindon, Utah.

52.

To start the business, they borrowed $20,000.00 from Father's parents. Before

separation, they borrowed an additional $25,000.00 from Father's parents.
53.

Neither of these loans was evidenced by a promissory note, nor were any terms

of repayment or interest established for the loans.

38.

Mother asserts the home was deeded as tenants in common for the protection

of the children and because she was more financially responsible than Father.
39.

Father's parents assert they deeded the home as tenants in common in order to

keep peace in the family and because they thought the parties would be together forever. This
explanation is somewhat lame as they would not have qualified for the tax treatment they sought
if they had not deeded the home jointly; they would have had a gift tax obligation. Thus, the
principal purpose for deed of the home in tenancy in common was for tax purposes. Clearly,
the parents intended a gift both to their son as well as to his wife so they could avoid gift tax
liability on the transfer.
40.

The home is a marital asset.

41.

In 1992, the home was appraised at $114,000.00.

42.

Jud Harward, an MAI appraiser, did a letter report as to the value of the home

on February 25, 1994, of $125,000.00.
43.

Mother places a value on the home of $130,000.00 to $135,000.00.

44.

Father believes the home is worth less now than in 1992 because he asserts

there has been fairly extensive damage to the home since the separation.
45.

Given the significant real property appreciation in this county during the year

and a half since the valuation of the home, it undoubtedly has increased in value, unless it has
suffered unusual depreciation or wear and tear.

59.

In support of Mother's claim, however, the truck which Father drives is owned

by the business and not included in the value of fixed assets, though the debt against the truck
was included in the liabilities. That truck has a value of $13,500.00.
60.

Ron King, the evaluator, noted that the depreciated value of business assets

almost always is less than true market value.
61.

In light of all of the assets given or loaned to the business by Father's parents,

together with reasonable depreciation, the value of the fixed assets seems somewhat low;
however, other than the value of the truck, no clear evidence of value was provided. The fixed
assets are valued at $11,000.00, plus $13,500.00, the value of the truck, a total of $24,500.00.
62.

Since the date of this account, Father's parents advanced additional funds,

making total notes payable of $66,333.30. Since that date, the FSB loan was reduced to
$7,000.00.
63.

The parties borrowed $7,000.00 from the children's trust accounts which the

children received from Mother's family. These monies were used to pay bills for the business.
Mother testified the parties intended to repay these loans with interest. Father testified he was
not aware the money was borrowed.
64.

The amount of these loans from the children's trust accounts should be included

as liabilities in the valuation of the business.
65.

If the balance sheet of the business is adjusted for fixed assets of $24,500.00,

notes payable of $66,333.30, FSB bank loan of $7,000.00, and loan from children of $7,000.00,

54.

Since the separation in 1993, parents have loaned an additional $21,333.30 to

Father for the business. For these loans to the business, parents are owed $66,333.30 by these
parties, plus interest.
55.

While the company tax returns show Father as the owner of the business, the

business was originally started for Mother to operate while Father maintained full-time
employment elsewhere.
56.

These parties each are owners of the business. It was built from loans from

Father's parents, but as both parties are liable for repayment of the loans, the business is a
marital asset.
57.

As of 12/31/93, the business had the following assets and liabilities:

Assets

Liabilities

Inventory
Fixed assets
Cash

$103,000
11,000
9,600

Accounts receivable

3.500

Total:

$127,100

Net Worth:

$22,228

58.

Accounts payable
Taxes payable
Notes payable
FSB bank loan

$ 23,800
8,120
55,957
12.815
$102,872

Mother believes the amount of the fixed assets is understated by about

$24,000.00; however, the description of fixed assets includes a fiberglass horse, a tractor, a
heater and a Ford truck, which were purchased by Father's parents and loaned to the business.

77.

The total income of the parties is $2,758.00. Father receives 63% of the

income. Based upon those amounts, for four children, total child support is $787.00, of which
Father's share is $495.00.
78.

Six horses are being kept at the home of Mother. Of the six, Ariel belongs to

Mother's mother. The remaining five belong to the parties and their children. Billy and Musket
were brought to the marriage by Mother. She should have them. Cody should be awarded to
Father and Tangent to Mother. The remaining pony belongs to the children and should be kept
by them.
79.

The parties have seven saddles, one of which Mother brought to the marriage

and one of which replaces a second saddle Mother brought to the marriage. Three saddles are
for the children and are awarded to them. The remaining saddles, an English saddle, a western
saddle, a dressage saddle and a Wintex saddle are divided the English, dressage and Wintex to
Mother, and the western saddle to Father.
80.

Father brought History of the Church, Journal of Discourses, dictionary,

pictures of Europe and much of the stereo system to the marriage. He should receive them.
81.

Mother brought the pony cart into the marriage, which she should receive.

82.

Father should receive the chairs from his family and the rocker which was a

gift from his parents.
83.

Father should receive the following items from the marital estate: bed, electric

piano, tools, clothes, stereo system, one-half of CD's and records and tapes, CD player,

73.

Mother is attending UVSC three-quarter time getting a degree in general

education, and also works 24 to 34 hours per week. She intends to become a math teacher. She
anticipates she will not graduate for at least five years. She has applied for a Pell grant which
only covers books and tuition. She has not attempted to obtain student loans.
74.

Mother now earns about $896.00 per month from her employment. She also

earns, after expenses, at least an average of $112.00 per month from horse training and horse
riding lessons, making total income to her of $1,008.00 per month. It appeared that she actually
earns more than this from her riding lessons and training, but the amount was unclear.
75.

Mother has been receiving child support in the amount of $304.00 per month.

76.

Father had income of $1,000.00 per month, but he also took the additional

$9,000.00 draw in 1993, a total of $21,000.00. He thus had income in 1993 of $1,750.00 per
month. It is appropriate that income be imputed to him in that amount as he has control over
the store; its debts, other than debts to parents, have been reduced; he is able-bodied; and while
working for the Church, he made even more. He now works in the store primarily to rescue
his parents' investment. The children suffer from less support than they deserve if he is able
to base his support on the monthly draws which he takes from the store, rather than on all of
the income he took from the store last year, an amount more nearly like what he earned before
working in the store. For purposes of calculating child support, Father's income is imputed at
$1,750.00 per month.

Thus, in arriving at a disposition of the assets and debts of the parties, she must receive credit
for this debt, a business debt for which she will be responsible.
89.

Mother seeks alimony.

90.

Given the amount of his reasonable living expenses and child support, when

contrasted with his income from the store, Father does not have the capacity to pay alimony.
Even at $21,000.00, the amount of his income in 1993, he does not have the capacity to provide
for his own needs, to pay child support and still pay alimony. Thus, although Mother seeks
alimony, Father does not have capacity to pay.
91.

Nor does Mother demonstrate significant need.

She receives income of

$1,000.00 and she has support of $495.00. She asserts expenses of $1,737.00. Because she has
control over the amount of riding lessons which she gives, she has control over her ability to
pay her own way.
92.

Father's attorney fees are in the sum of $8,020.00, which appears necessarily

incurred and reasonable in amount.
93.

Mother's attorney fees are in the sum of $5,125.00, which appears necessarily

incurred and reasonable in amount.
94.

Neither party has the capacity to pay the other's fees.

95.

The cost of the custodial evaluation should be borne equally by the parties. To

the extent not already done, each should pay one-half of the evaluation.

computer, weight set, one-half kitchen appliances, one-half linens, one-half family pictures, onehalf games, one bookcase, TV and VCR, one-half of silverware and cookware, one set of
clippers, hide-a-bed, green couch, stove, one-half of tack other than saddles, camper, one-half
of videos.
84.

Mother should receive the following items from

the marital estate:

encyclopedias, piano, couch, TV and VCR, beds, dressers, refrigerator, one-half kitchen
appliances, one-half linens, one-half family pictures, one-half games, children's encyclopedias,
pipe corral, hot walker, one-half of silverware and cookware, horse clippers, wheelbarrow, onehalf of videos, one-half of CD's and records and tapes, one-half of tack other than saddles.
85.

The foregoing disposition of property is not fully inclusive of all items. The

parties are to divide any unlisted items evenly between them.
86.

Given the values attributed to the items awarded to each from the marital estate,

because Mother receives more horses and saddles, as well as the pipe corral and the hot walker
while Father receives the camper, Father will receive less in value than Mother receives. The
estimated difference in value is approximately $1,500.00. Father is entitled to receive that sum
from Mother.
87.

The truck which Father drives is owned by the business. As he will keep the

business, he gets the truck. Its value is included in the business valuation, as is its debt.
88.

The remaining balance of the First Security Bank home equity loan, a loan to

the business, is secured by a mortgage on the home. Mother has agreed to pay this mortgage.

2.

While the Court orders joint legal custody, it concludes that primary physical

custody should rest with Mother. Given the ages of the girls, Cari Jo's much closer bonding
with her mother, and the express conclusion of all, including the Court, that the children be kept
together, the Court concludes Mother is best suited to serve as the primary custodial parent.
3.

Liberal visitation is awarded to Father, to include the statutory visitation,

augmented by allowing Father, so long as he lives close and it is convenient, to have the
children visit more regularly after school in his parents' home and by allowirg Father to provide
day care for Tyler personally or through Tyler's grandparents.
4.

The Court hereby approves the parenting plan drafted by the defendant and

amended by the plaintiff.
Disposition of Property.
5.

Mother is awarded the home, horses and saddles and personal property as

described, but is liable for the mortgage, the difference in value of personal property, and must
pay Father for his one-half equity in the ho^e upon her remarriage, death, refinancing the home
or further encumbering it, cohabiting with another male, or the youngest child reaching age 18.
Mother, Jerri K. Schwartz, is awarded all right, title and interest in and to the home, which
property is more specifically described as follows:
Beginning at a point 1211.32 feet North and 230 feet West of
the Southeast corner of the Southeast one-quarter of Section
34, Township 5 South, Range 2 East, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian; thence West 100 feet; thence North 209.17 feet;

96.

A legal description of the home belonging to the parties, which was purchased

by Father's parents and awarded to the plaintiff mother is more particularly described as follows:

Beginning at a point 1211.32 feet North and 230 feet West of
the Southeast corner of the Southeast one-quarter of Section
34, Township 5 South, Range 2 East, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian; thence West 100 feet; thence North 209.17 feet;
thence South 88° 15' East 100.05 feet; thence South 206.11
feet to beginning.
97.

The additional cost of the custodial evaluation not already paid for is the sum

of $731.98.
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
From the foregoing facts, the Court makes the following conclusions:
1.

Based upon the foregoing findings, the Court concludes that it is in the best

interest of the children that an order of joint legal custody be entered. The Court commends
both parents for their demonstrated ability to work cooperatively together for the benefit of he
children. The separation of divorce and temporary decisions as to custody and visitation place
great emotional strains upon parents who share a mutual love for their children. In this case,
these parents have been able to work together in spite of that emotional strain. The Court finds
that there is significant potential for success in a joint legal custody arrangement and orders joint
legal custody.

9.

Both parties are to share equally in the cost of the custodial evaluation. To the

extent one party has borne a greater share of the cost than the other, that party is entitled to
reimbursement from the other so that each pays an equal amount.
Child Support.
10.

Pursuant to the guidelines, child support is fixed at $495.00 per month. As

Father has always paid child support and as he is an owner of the business rather than an
employee, a withhold and deliver is not required unless subsequent evidence is provided which
demonstrates a failure to pay on a timely basis. Father is hereby ordered to pay child support
to Mother in the sum of $495.00 per month.
Alimony.
11.

Mother would like alimony while she goes to school. Yet, she is quite able to

provide for her own care, particularly when the amount of child support is added in. As well,
he has use of a home without rent or significant mortgage debt. While she claims need, it was
not really demonstrated. She has income and support of around $1,500.00 per month. Her
expenses are listed as $1,737.00. Mother has control over the amount of riding lessons she
teaches. As such, it appears she has capacity to earn the shortfall which exists between her
income and her listed expenses. Mother anticipates completing schooling in about 5 to 6 years.
Then she anticipates sufficient income to meet her needs.
12.

Nor does Father have the ability to pay alimony. To a great extent, this family

has 1;ved on the generosity of Father's parents. While he has a legal obligation to his divorcing

thence South 88° 15' East 100.05 feet; thence South 206.11
feet to beginning.
6.

Father is awarded the business, the camper and personal property as described,

but is liable for repaying the children's trust accounts the amount which the business borrowed,
and to pay Mother one-half of the value of the business.
7.

The evening-out of the various liabilities of the parties to each other will occur

by adjustment to the home equity owed by Mother to Father.
Mother owes Father:

less
less

$62,500
14,174
7,000

plus

1.500

Total:

Home equity
Business equity he owes her
Mortgage debt she will pay
Excess of value of personal property

$42,826

This amount is due from Mother to Father at the appointed time. This is equitable, as
Mother has a home to live in but he does not. It is appropriate he not pay her the equity from
the business until she pays him the equity from the home. This allows him maximum funds for
the present from which he can finance his own housing and living expenses.
8.

Father is obligated to replace into the children's trust accounts the sum of

$7,000.00. To ensure the funds are available for the children, both parties are to be signatories
on the children's trust accounts; withdrawals only can occur upon the child reaching 18 or upon
further order of the Court. These funds are to be replaced within one year of entry of the
decree.

4-2.6

visitation.

Given the extent of mid-week visitation, no special visitation for the children's

birthdays will be provided. Other than these modifications, the parenting plan, Exhibit 17, is
adopted. The parties may agree upon such additions or changes to the plan as they think
appropriate, but are directed to execute the plan, as amended hereby, unless they otherwise agree
in writing on a different plan.
DATED this

/ ' day ofjiSy, 1994.
BY THE COURT

ANTHONY W. SCHOF1ELD
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the
following, postage prepaid, this

day of May, 1994.

C. Robert Collins, Esq.
P. O. Box 243
405 East State Road
American Fork, TJT 84003
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wife, his parents do not. The Court imputes income to him for purposes of protecting the
children but will not do so where, with a modest stretch, Mother can provide for her own needs
without receipt of alimony.
Attorney Fees.
13.

Neither party has the ability to pay the other's attorney fees.

None are

awarded.
Parenting Plan.
14.

In the custody decision, the Court directed the parties to agree on a parenting

plan. They came close but did not complete the negotiation process. The Court therefore will
direct appropriate adjustments to the draft parenting plan received as Exhibit 17 and the
offsetting comments received as Exhibit 19.
15.

Visitation, though liberal, only includes five weeks of summertime visitation

with Father, whose visitation will be divided into a two-week period and a three-week period.
Mother shall have a two-week period between the two visitation periods with Father. Mid-week
visitation will end at 8:00 p.m. on school nights and 9:00 p.m. on non-school nights. The
Christmas holiday will alternate every year, with one party having the children from the
beginning of the school Christmas recess until December 26, and the other party having the
children from December 26 until the end of the school recess. The party having visitation
starting after Christmas Day will get Thanksgiving visitation during that year. Father will pick
up the children for visitation, and Mother will pick up the children at the conclusion of

more than three months preceding this action the parties resided in Utah County.
During the course of the marriage irreconcilable differences arose between the parties
making the continuation of the marriage impossible. Grounds and jurisdiction exist.
2.

Since 1984 the parties have lived in a home in Lindon, Utah which was

purchased by Father's parents.
3.

In 1986 a major addition of about 1000 square feet was added to the

home. The addition was paid for by Father's parents.
4.

The parties never paid any rent for their occupancy of the house. For

the years 1987-1991, they did pay the property taxes on the house.
5.

Prior to 1991 the parties participated with Father's parents in imj , ng

the home by building a barn and installing a sprinkling system. The parents pai/ ' r
the sprinkling system. During that same time the parties performed general
maintenance and up-keep and they paid for these smaller improvements.
6.

In 1991 Father's parents deeded the home to the parties as tenants ai

common.
7.

After 1991 there were minor improvements to the property includi* g

construction of a hay barn and installation of a secondary irrigation water line.
Monies for the hay barn came from the family budget
8.

In August 1992 the home was used as collateral to borrow $15,00i

which was used to buy a 1986 Suburban and also horse trailers for business
inventory.

Mother has been paying interest only on that loan in the amount of $50

per month.
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IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JERRI K. SCHWARTZ,

CASE NUMBER: 934400154
Plaintiff,
DATE: MARCH 30, 1994

vs.
RULING
RANDALL I. SCHWARTZ,
Defendant.

ANTHONY W. SCHOFIELD, JUDGE

Trial on the issues of custody and visitation was held December 20, 1993.
The Court issued it's written decision on January 19, 1994. Disposition of the home,
business and personal property and issues of support were reserved for subsequent
trial, held March 1, 1994.
Don R. Petersen represented plaintiff ("Mother") and C. Robert Collins
represented defendant ("Father"). Having heard the testimony of witnesses, received
documentary evidence and listened to arguments of counsel, the Court now makes its
ruling.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The Court finds that the following facts have been proven by a preponderance
of the evidence.
1.

Hie parties were married in 1980 and separated in early 1993. For

16.

In 1992 the home was appraised at $114,000.

17.

Jud Harward, an MAI appraiser, did a letter report as to the value of

the home on February 25, 1994 of $125,000.
18.

Mother places a value on the home of $130 - $135,000.

19.

Father believes the home is worth less now than in 1992 because he

asserts there has been fairly extensive damage to the home since the separation.
20.

Given the significant real property appreciation in this county during

the year and a half since the valuation of the home, it undoubtedly has increased in
value unless it has suffered unusual depreciation or wear and tear.
21.

The video tapes received in evidence depict the condition of the home

shortly after the separation as well as its current condition. While very cluttered
during the recent inspection and video (Exhibit 21), there has been some damage but
not extensive damage. There were, for example, some new holes in the sheet rock
walls and pencil and crayon scribbles on the walls. As the damage was not extensive,
it does not appear significantly to decrease the value of the home.
22.

In other contexts this Court has received evidence of a ten percent

increase over that time period. While it cannot rely on that extrinsic evidence, the
home does have a value greater than the 1992 appraisal. Given the appraiser's report
and Mother's testimony that it could be sold for more than the 1992 appraisal, the
home is valued at $125,000.
23.

Mother desires to live in the home. She has custody of the children

and they have lived in the home since 1984. It is in the best interest of the children

9.

Father asserts his parents told him the home was to be a gift to him, a

part of his inheritance, and they wanted him to have it now so it could mutually
benefit everybody including the children. There was no similar discussion between
the parents and Mother regarding it being Father's inheritance.
10.

As part of parents' estate planning, an attorney assisted parents with

conveying the property. For tax purposes the property was gifted to the parties over
a period of three years.
11.

Parents executed the deed to the home at their attorney's office; neither

of the parties were present nor had input into the form of the deed.
12.

Father never told Mother that the home was his property or that she did

not have an ownership interest until after she filed for this divorce.
13.

Mother asserts the home was deeded as tenants in common for the

protection of the children and because she was more financially responsible than
Father.
14.

Father's parents assert they deeded the home as tenants in common in

order to keep peace in the family and because they thought the parties would be
together forever. This explanation is somewhat lame as they would not have qualified
for the tax treatment they sought if they had not deeded the home jointly, they would
have had a gift tax obligation. Thus, the principal purpose for deed of the home in
tenancy in common was for tax purposes. Clearly the parents intended a gift both to
their son as well as to his wife so they could avoid gift tax liability on the transfer.
15.

The home is a marital asset.

Accts. Receivable

33.

3.500

TOTAL

$127,100

Net Worth

$24,228

FSB Bank Loan

12.815
$102,872

Mother believes the amount of the fixed assets is understated by about

$24,000. However, the description of fixed assets includes a fiberglass horse, a
tractor, a heater and a Ford truck which were purchased by Father's parents and
loaned to the business.
34.

In support of Mother's claim, however, the truck which Father drives

is owned by the business and not included in the value of fixed assets though the debt
against the truck was included in the liabilities. That truck has a value of $13,500.
35.

Ron King, the evaluator, noted that the depreciated value of business

assets almost always is less than true market value.
36.

In light of all of the assets given or loaned to the business by Father's

parents, together with reasonable depreciation, the value of the fixed assets seems
somewhat low, however other than the value of the truck, no clear evidence of value
was provided. The fixed assets are valued at $11,000 plus $13,500, the value of the
truck, for a total of $24,500.
37.

Since the date of this account, Father's parents advanced additional

funds, making total notes payable of $66,333.30. Since that date the FSB loan was
reduced to $7,000.
38.

The parties borrowed $7,000 from the children's trust accounts which

the children received from Mother's family. These monies were used to pay bills for

and Mother that they be permitted to reside in the home during the children's growing
years.
24.

Mother is awarded the home.

25.

Father has an equity in the home of one half of its value, or $62,500.

26.

In 1987 the parties started a business, a feed store in Lindon, Utah.

27.

To start the business they borrowed $20,000 from Father's parents.

Before separation they borrowed an additional $25,000 from Father's parents.
28.

Neither of these loans was evidenced by a promissory note nor were

any terms of repayment or interest established for the loans.
29.

Since the separation in 1993, parents have loaned an additional

$21,333.30 to Father for the business. For these loans to the business, parents are
owed $66,333.30 by these parties, plus interest.
30.

While the company tax returns show Father as the owner of the

business, the business was originally started for Mother to operate while Father
maintained full time employment elsewhere.
31.

These parties each are owners of the business. It was built from loans

from Father's parents, but as both parties are liable for repayment of the loans, the
business is a marital asset.
32.

As of 12-31-93, the business had the following assets and liabilities:
Assets

Inventory
Fixed Assets
Cash

Liabilities
$103,000
11,000
9,600

Accounts Payable
Taxes Payable
Notes Payable

$ 23,800
8,120
55,957

store. He draws $1,000 per month from the business, although the accountant
reviewing the books of the business testified that in 1993 Father also took a $9,000
draw from the business which was not explained nor contradicted.
46.

Father has not sought other employment. He is trying to protect his

parent's investment.
47.

Father is in good health.

48.

Mother is attending UVSC three-quarter time getting a degree in

general education, and also works 24 to 34 hours per week. She intends to become a
math teacher.

She anticipates she will not graduate for at least five years. She has

applied for a Pell grant which only covers books and tuition. She has not attempted
to obtain student loans.
49.

Mother now earns about $896 per month from her employment. She

also earns, after expenses, at least an average of $112 per month from horse training
and horse riding lessons, making total income to her of $1,008 per month. It
appeared that she actually earns more than this from her riding lessons and training,
but the amount was unclear.
50.

Mother has been receiving child support in the amount of $304 per

51.

Fathef had income of $1,000 per month but he also took the additional

month.

$9,000 draw in 1993, a total of $21,000. He thus had income in 1993 of $1,750 per
month. It is appropriate that income be imputed to him in that amount as he has
control over the store; its debts, other than debts to parents, have been reduced; he is

the business. Mother testified the parties intended to repay these loans with interest.
Father testified he was not aware the money was borrowed.
39.

The amount of these loans from the children's trust accounts should be

included as liabilities in the valuation of the business.
40.

If the balance sheet of the business is adjusted for fixed assets of

$24,500, notes payable of $66,333, FSB bank loan of $7,000 and loan from children
of $7,000, total assets are $140,600, total liabilities are $112,253, and the net value
of the business is $28,347. That is the value which the Court places upon the
business. One half of that value is $14,174.
41.

Father desires to retain ownership of the business so that he can work

to recover for his parents their investment. It is appropriate that he be awarded the
business.
42.

Post-separation Father's parents requested that the loans be reduced to

written documentation and they requested repayment. While the Court will not so
order, the parties do owe the parents the described sum and appropriate written
evidence should be prepared.
43.

Father is still residing with his parents and is paying Mother support

for the children.
44.

Prior to November 1992 Father worked for the L.D.S. Church as a

custodian. Immediately before his voluntarily termination of employment with the
church he was making $10.61 an hour, or approximately $1,800 per month.
45.

Following termination with the church, Father went to work at the feed

should receive them.
56.

Mother brought the pony cart into the mat iage, which she should

receive.
57.

Father should receive the chairs from his firmly and the rocker which

was a gift from his parents.
58.

Father should receive the following items irom the marital estate:

bed, electric piano, tools, clothes, stereo system, one hal of CD's and records and
tapes, CD player, computer, weight set, one half kitchen appliances, one half linens,
one half family pictures, one half games, one bookcase, VV and VCR, one half of
silver ware and cook ware, one set of clippers, hide-a-bc/, green couch, stove, one
half of tack other than saddles, camper, one half of video .
59.

Mother should receive the following items irom the marital estate:

encyclopedias, piano, couch, TV and VCR, beds, dressi , refrigerator, one half
kitchen appliances, one half linens, one half family pictu s, one half games,
children's encyclopedias, pipe corral, hot walker, one h
ware, horse clippers, wheelbarrow, one half of videos,

of silver ware and cook
half of CD's and records

and tapes, one half of tack other than saddles.
60.

The foregoing disposition of property is &* fully inclusive of all items.

The parties are to divide any unlisted items evenly betwc * them.
61.

Given the values attributed to the items a\

ded to each from the

marital estate, because Mother receives more horses and

ddles as well as the pipe

corral and the hot walker while Father receives the canij

, Father will receive less in
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able-bodied; and while working for the church he made even more. He now works in
the store primarily to rescue his parents' investment. The children suffer from less
support than they deserve if he is able to base his support on the monthly draws
which he takes from the store, rather than on all of the income he took from the store
last year, an amount more nearly like what he earned before working in the store.
For purposes of calculating child support Father's income is imputed at $1,750 per
month.
52.

The total income of the parties is $2,758. Father receives 63% of the

income. Based upon those amounts, for four children total child support is $787, of
which Father's share is $495.
53.

Six horses are being kept at the home of Mother. Of the six, Ariel

belongs to Mother's mother. The remaining five belong to the parties and their
children. Billy and Musket were brought to the marriage by Mother. She should
have them. Cody should be awarded to Father and Tangent to Mother. The
remaining pony belongs to the children and should be kept by them.
54.

The parties have seven saddles, one of which Mother brought to the

marriage and one of which replaces a second saddle Mother brought to the marriage.
Three saddles are for the children and are awarded to them. The remaining saddles,
an English saddle, a western saddle, a dressage saddle and a Wintex saddle are
divided the English, dressage and Wintex to Mother and the western saddle to Father.
55.

Father brought History of the Church, Journal of Discourses,

dictionary, pictures of Europe and much of the stereo system to the marriage. He

68.

Mother's attorney's fees are in the sum of $5,125, which appears

necessarily incurred and reasonable in amount.
69.

Neither party has the capacity to pay the others fees.

70.

The cost of the custodial evaluation should be born equally by the

parties. To the extent not already done, each should pay one half of the evaluation.
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
From the foregoing facts the Court makes the following conclusions:
Disposition of property•
Mother is awarded the home, horses and saddles and personal property as
described but is liable for the mortgage, the difference in value of personal property,
and must pay Father for his one half equity in the home up m her remarriage, death,
refinancing the home or further encumbering it, cohabiting with another male, or the
youngest child reaching age eighteen.
Father is awarded the business, the camper and personal property as described
but is liable for repaying the children's trust accounts the amount which the business
borrowed and to pay wife one half of the value of the business.
The evening out of the various liabilities of the parties to each other will occur
by adjustment to the home equity owed by Mother to Father.
Mother owes Father:

less
less
plus
TOTAL

$62,500
$14,174
$ 7,000
$ 1,500
$42,826.

Home equity
business equity he owes her
mortgage debt she will pay
excess of value of personal property

L

value than Mother receives. The estimated difference in value is approximately
$1,500. Father is entitled to receive that sum from Mother.
62.

The truck which Father drives is owned by the business. As he will

keep the business, he gets the truck. Its value is included in the business valuation,
as is its debt.
63.

The remaining balance of the First Security Bank home equity loan, a

loan to the business, is secured by a mortgage on the home. Mother has agreed to
pay this mortgage. Thus, in arriving at a disposition of the assets and debts of the
parties, she must receive credit for this debt, a business debt for which she will be
responsible.
64.

Mother seeks alimony.

65.

Given the amount of his reasonable living expenses and child support ,

when contrasted with his income from the store, Father does not have the capacity to
pay alimony. Even at $21,000, the amount of his income in 1993, he does not have
the capacity to provide for his own needs, to pay child support and still pay alimony.
Thus, although Mother seeks alimony, Father does not have capacity to pay.
66.

Nor does Mother demonstrate significant need. She receives income of

$1,000 and she has support of $495. She asserts expenses of $1,737. Because she
has control over the amount of riding lessons which she gives, she has control over
her ability to pay her own way.
67.

Father's attorney's fees are in the sum of $8,020, which appears

necessarily incurred and reasonable in amount.

claims need, it was not really demonstrated. She has income and support of around
$1,500 per month. Her expenses are listed as $1,737. Mother has control over the
amount of riding lessons she teaches. As such, it appears she has capacity to earn the
shortfall which exists between her income and her listed expenses. Mother anticipates
completing schooling in about 5-6 years. Then she anticipates sufficient income to
meet her needs.
Nor does Father have the ability to pay alimony. To a great extent this family
has lived on the generosity of Father's parents. While he has a legal obligation to his
divorcing wife, his parents do not. The Court imputes income to him for purposes of
protecting the children but will not do so where with a modest stretch, Mother can
provide for her own needs without receipt of alimony.
Attorney's fees.
Neither party has the ability to pay the other's attorney's fees. None are
awarded.
Parenting plan.
In the custody decision the Court directed the parties to agree on a parenting
plan. They came close but did not complete the negotiation process. The Court
therefore will direct appropriate adjustments to the draft parenting plan received as
exhibit 17 and the offsetting comments received as exhibit 19.
Visitation, though liberal, only includes five weeks for summer time visitation
with Father, whose visitation will be divided into a two week period and a three week
period. Mother shall have a two week period between the two visitation periods with

This amount is due from Mother to Father at the appointed time. This is equitable as
Mother has a home to live in but he does not. It is appropriate he not pay her the
equity from the business until she pays him the equity from the home. This allows
him maximum funds for the present from which he can finance his own housing and
living expenses.
Father is obligated to replace into the children's trust accounts the sum of
$7,000. To ensure the funds are available for the children, both parties are to be
signatories on the children's trust accounts; withdrawals only can occur upon the child
reaching eighteen or upon further order of the Court. These funds are to be replaced
within one year of entry of the decree.
Both parties are to share equally in the cost of the custodial evaluation. To the
extent one party has born a greater share of the cost than the other, that party is
entitled to reimbursement from the other so that each pays an equal amount.
Child support.
Pursuant to the guidelines, child support is fixed at $495 per month. As
Father has always paid child support and as he is an owner of the business rather than
an employee, withhold and deliver is not required unless subsequent evidence is
provided which demonstrates a failure to pay on a timely basis.
Alimony.
Mother would like alimony while she goes to school. Yet, she is quite able to
provide for her own care, particularly when the amount of child support is added in.
As well, she has use of a home without rent or significant mortgage debt. While she
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IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JERRI K. SCHWARTZ,

CASE NUMBER: 934400154
Plaintiff,
DATE: JANUARY 19, 1994

vs.
DECISION
RANDALL I. SCHWARTZ,
ANTHONY W. SCHOFIELD, JUDGE
Defendant.

Trial on the issue of custody and visitation was held December 20,
1993. All other issues were reserved for trial on March 1, 1994. Don R.
Peterson represented plaintiff ("Mother") and C. Robert Collins represented
defendant ("Father"). The Court heard the testimony of witnesses, received the
documentary evidence, and heard the arguments of counsel. On January 5,
1994 the Court interviewed the children in chambers. The Court now makes its
ruling.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The Court finds that the following facts have been proven by a
preponderance of the evidence.
1.
children:

The parties were married in 1980 and are the parents of four
Cari Jo Schwartz, age 12
Kelli Schwartz, age 10
Derek Schwartz, age 6
Tyler Schwartz, age 3.

Father. Mid-week visitation will end at 8:00 p.m. on school nights and 9:00 p.m. on
non-school nights. The Christmas holiday will alternate every year, with one party
having the children from the beginning of the school Christmas recess until December
26 and the other party having the children from December 26 until the end of the
school recess. The parly having visitation starting after Christmas day will get
Thanksgiving visitation during that year. Father will pick up children for visitation
and Mother will pick up the children at the conclusion of visitation. Given the extent
of mid-week visitation, no special visitation for the children's birthdays will be
provided. Other than these modifications, the parenting plan, exhibit 17, is adopted.
The parlies may agree upon such additions or changes to the plan as they think
appropriate, but are directed to execute the plan, as amended hereby unless they
otherwise agree in writing on a different plan.
Pursuant to Rule 4-504, Utah Code of Judicial Administration, Mother's
counsel is directed to prepare findings of fact, conclusions of law and a decree of
divorce consistent with the findings in this and the custody decision and to circulate
them to counsel.
Dated this 30th day of March, 1994.
BY THE COURT:

y

ANTHONY W. SCHOFIELD, JUDGE
cc: Don R. Petersen, Esq.
C. Robert Collins, Esq.
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source of genuine stability for the other children, shouldering a burden that a
12-year old should not have to bear. In a sense, she is a surrogate parent for
the younger children.
13.

Kelli is ten, and is bright and able. She is a happy child that is

resilient and less troubled by circumstances than Cari Jo. She has a warm,
loving relationship with both parents.
14.

Each of the two boys is active, inquisitive and warm-hearted.

Each is relatively unaware of all that the divorce implies and each has a strong
bond with both parents.
15.

Given the observed interaction of the children, they each would

be best served by being kept together. It would be destructive to Cari Jo, who
has a strong, protective nature for her siblings, to be separated from them.
Equally, it would be damaging to Derek and Tyler, who rely to a large extent
on their older sisters, to be separated from them. For the present, the children
must be kept together.
16.

Cari Jo has a more strained relationship with Father than with

Mother. He has not understood her as well and doesn't relate as well with her
as does Mother.
17.

Each of the parents is morally responsible. Each has a

commitment to teach values appropriate for our society and community. Each
has similar religious values. Either would do well in exemplifying values for
(he children.

2.

Each of the children are well-adjusted and each has significant

interaction with both Father and Mother.
3.

Father's parents live near the marital home and have provided

extensive child care over the years for each of the children.
4.

Under a temporary order, Mother has lived in the marital home.

5.

Under the temporary order, Mother has temporary custody of the

children.
6.

By agreement between the parties, the children have visited with

Father every other weekend and have had two midweek visits with Father each
week.
7.

The effect of the visitation schedule is that the children have

retained a strong bond with both parents. Each has been able to spend
considerable time with the children.
8.

The parties have been reasonably cooperative with each other to

insure the children have ready access to both parents.
9.

Mother has been particularly sensitive to have the children spend

time with Father.
10.

Fach of the parents desires custody of the children.

11.

Fach of the parents desires that the children be kept together.

12.

Cari Jo, the oldest child, is a very sensitive young woman,

demonstrably affected by the divorce proceedings. She has responded by
becoming protective and caring for the younger children. She has been a

with his grandparents.
24.

Joint legal custody as defined in Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.1

would be in the best interests of the children.
a.

Both parents appear capable of implementing joiiit legal

custody as each has cooperated to a large extent in insuring that
the children have access to both parents.
b.

As the four children each have a significant bond with

each parent, that bond would be fostered by a determination of
joint legal custody.
c.

Each of the children has been well cared for physically,

psychologically and emotionally. During the temporary period
the parents have been able to meet the needs of the children
without undue difficulty. The children would continue to be
cared for physically, psychologically and emotionally if an award
of joint legal custody is entered.
d.

The parents have demonstrated an ability to give first

priority to the welfare of their children and have been able so far
to reach shared decisions in the best interests of the children.
e.

Each parent so far has and is capable of encouraging

positive relationships between the children and the other parent.
The Court is impressed with the maturity of the parents and the
willingness they demonstrated to work cooperatively together in

18.

Each of the parents is similarly situated with respect to financial

understanding and money management. The family has received considerable
financial support from grandparents of the children and neither parent has
demonstrated a better ability to manage the family's financial resources than the
other. Without the consistent support of grandparents, the family would have
faced financial ruin long ago.
19.

Neither parent has personality quirks or particularly unrealistic

expectations that would render that parent less fit to serve as custodial parent.
20.

Father is more rigid and somewhat less flexible than Mother.

21.

Mother is significantly involved in improving her lot through

additional education. She tends to over extend herself some as she works, goes
to school, and has a major commitment to horse care and riding, which is both
a hobby and an outlet for stress and frustration.
22.

While each parent has been a significant care giver for the

children, Mother has provided a greater portion of the parental care as between
the parents although Father's parents (the children's paternal grandparents) have
provided considerable care for the children both in the form of day care as well
as care in the marital home. Directly and through his parents, Father has been
able to provide meaningful care to the children while they have been in his care
for visitation.
23.

Tyler goes to Kinder Care day care. He also receives day care

from his grandparents. This should be allowed to continue as he has a bond

Liberal visitation is awarded to Father, to include the statutory
visitation, augmented by allowing Father, so long as he lives close and it is
convenient, to have the children visit more regularly after school in his parents'
home and by allowing Father to provide day care for Tyler personally or
through Tyler's grandparents.
The Court could spell out precise terms of the joint legal cir \ 1y order
and a precise visitation and day care schedule. Rather, however, given the
time until trial of the remaining issues in this divorce proceeding, the Court
orders the parties to meet together, with their attorneys within fifteen (15) days,
to develop a co-parenting plan and a visitation and child care schedule which is
in the best interests of the children and which provides for liberal visitation
with Father and the ability by him and his parents to provide child care service
for Tyler. If the parties are unable to develop a co-parenting plan within
fifteen (15) days after such meeting the Court orders mediation as to such
issues. These parties have accomplished much cooper; ively. They are
ordered to attempt to resolve these remaining issues cc peratively.
This is an interim order so no formal findings and conclusions need be
prepared at this time. At the time of final hearing the ourt will order one of
the parties to prepare findings and conclusions as to the issues resolved in this

the best interests of the children.
f.

At present the parents live just a few blocks apart. The

children are able to walk between residences and to receive
support from each parent.
25.

Based upon these findings, joint legal custody has a significant

likelihood of working in this case and each of the parents has demonstrated the
ability to work cooperatively for the benefit of the children.
DECISION
Based upon the foregoing findings, the Court concludes that it is in the
best interest of the children that an order of joint legal custody be entered. The
Court commends both parents for their demonstrated ability to work
cooperatively together for the benefit of the children. The separation of divorce
and temporary decisions as to custody and visitation place great emotional
strains upon parents who share a mutual love for their children. In this case
these parents have been able to work together in spite of that emotional strain.
The Court finds that there is significant potential for success in a joint legal
custody arrangement and orders joint legal custody.
While the Court orders joint legal custody, it concludes that primary
physical custody should rest with Mother. Given the ages of the girls, Cari
Jo's much closer bonding with her mother and the express conclusion of all,
including the Court, that the children be kept together, the Court concludes
Mother is best suited to serve as the primary custodial parent.

decision.
Dated this 19th day of January, 1994.
BY THE COURT:

ANTHONY/
S C H O F I E L D J Jl
JUDGE
^NTHON"YJ W. SCHOFltiLD;
cc: Don R. Petersen, Esq.
C. Robert Collins, Esq.
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